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PROPERTY RIGHTS IN LETTERS
ArTER they have served their immediate purpose, letters are ordinarily
discarded or filed and then forgotten. But occasionally such letters become
subjects of disputes between the sender and receiver or other interested per-
sons. Perhaps someone has received letters from a literary celebrity and
wishes to publish them. A vindictive maid, jilted by her faithless swain,
may wish to publish his letters to display his perfidy to the world. Or a
writer may desire the return of his letter after he has sent it. hqien a
conflict of this sort precipitates a lawsuit, the courts must decide whether
the various interests asserted with respect to the letter involved are entitled
to judicial protection, or in the language of the law, whether they constitute
property rights. Litigation relating to these problems has mainly concerned
three polar issues: the physical document itself, the ideas contained in the
letter, and its-publication. The meagre case law can be conveniently analyzed
in terms of these issues.
Physical Document. The receiver of a letter' is said to obtain by gift
complete ownership of everything material that passes into his possession
when he gets the letter, including the paper, the ink, the envelope, the postage
stamp, and the postal mark-.2 Accordingly, he has been granted many of
the usual incidents of ownership. He is under no duty to the sender to pre-
serve the letter but may destroy it at wilI.a He may successfully maintain
a civil suit to recover letters wrongfully taken from him," and a criminal
1. If a letter which has a return address on the outside fails to reach its intended
receiver, it will be returned to such return address If there is no return address on
the envelope, the letter is sent to the Dead Letter Office. All these letters are opened
by government clerks in an effort to effect delivery or return. Undeliverable printed
matter obviously without value is sold as waste paper. Undeliverable or unreturnable
letters containing correspondence are burned. U. S. Post Office Dep't-Postal Laws and
Regulations (1932) §§804-S31.
An amazing array of articles is removed from letters and packages sent to the
Dead Letter Office. Among things found have been a plush reticule, a woman's rubber
circular, a mustache comb, a pair of man's cotton flannel drawers, a fish knife, a uterine
supporter, a metal whistle, and innumerable pairs of women's corsets. For a complete
list of articles sold at auction by the Dead Letter Office, see U. S. Post Office Dep't-
Dead Letter Office Sale (1893).
2. See Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. 480, 486, 493 (1867); Baker v. Libbie,
210 Mass. 599, 606, 97 N. E. 109, 112 (1912) ; A.xnun, COPYMGHT Lw Arm PirieACU
(1936) 48; 1 MORGAN, LAwv oF LiTmEATuRE (1875) 451; Parker, Jurisdiction of Chan-
cery Courts to Restrain Publication of Letters (1853) 1 Ar. L. REG. 449, 457.
Possession by the receiver of letters addressed to him is prima fade evidence of
ownership. Tefft v. Marsh, 1 W. Va. 38 (1864).
3. See Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. 480, 486 (1867); Baker v. Libbie, 210
Mfass. 599, 606, 97 N. E. 109, 112 (1912); 1 MORGAn, LAw OF Lrmu.asu (1375)
-448; Parker, supra note 2, at 457.
4. Dock v. Dock, 180 Pa. 14, 36 At. 411 (1897) (letters surreptitiously removed
from trunk); Oliver v. Oliver, 11 C.B. N. S. 139 (1861) (bailee refused to return
letters); see MacMillan & Co. v. Dent, [1906] 1 Cl. 101, 108.
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action for larceny may lie if the letters have been stolen from him.0 The
receiver likewise has a fairly complete power of alienation during his life,
so long as its exercise does not amount to publication of the word-form of
the letter.0 Thus, he usually may sell the letter, as, for example, to a col-
lector or dealer, or he may give it away.7 In addition to being in large part
alienable during the receiver's life, letters are treated much like other per-
sonal property at his death. At one time it was suggested that the receiver
of a letter had but a life estate in it,8 as the letter was meant for the receiver
It has been held that the statute of limitations and, adverse possession operate
against a receiver who has lost his letters only if he has been informed of such adverse
possession or if such possession was dishonest or wrongful. Mayor of New York v.
Lent, 51 Barb. 19 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1868); cf. O'Neill v. General Film Co., 171 App.
Div. 854, 157 N. Y. Supp. 1028 (1st Dep't 1916).
5. Whether letters are subjects of larceny depends upon the wording and con-
struction of the statute in the particular jurisdiction. See 2 Bisuop, CnimNAL LAW
(9th ed. 1923) §904 (1); 1 MORGAN, LAw or LiTERATURE (1875) 443; 2 WnA.rox,
CvarimL LAw (12th ed. 1932) § 1117; The Law of Stolen Letters (1908) 15 BE.cne
& BAR 1.
6. The receiver may show the letter to his friends, or he may read it aloud to
them. See Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. 480, 488, 490 (1867); Baker v. Libble,
210 MNfass. 599, 606, 97 N. E. 109, 112 (1912); Gee v.'Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402, 416,
424 (1818); Labouchere v. Hess, 77 L. T. R. 559, 563 (1897). But cf. Thurston v.
Charles, 21 T. L. P 659 (1905). Or he may make copies of the letter and show them
to his friends. 1 MoRGAN, LAw OF LTRrAauRu (1875) 445; Parker, supra note 2, at
458. In short, he is free to make any reasonable use of the letter which does not amount
to a widespread publication of its word-form. For a discussion of the legal relations
incident to publication, see infra, p. 498.
7. Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. 480 (1867); see Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass.
599, 606, 97 N. E. 109, 112 (1912); 1 MORGAN, LAv oF LiTERATURE (1875) 448; cf.
Oliver v. Oliver, I1 C.B. N. S. 139 (1861).
This privilege of alienation is quite similar to the well-recognized privilege of the
owner of an unpublished manuscript to sell it. Maurel v. Smith, 271 Fed. 211 (C. C. A.
2d, 1921); see Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N.Y. 532, 538 (1872); Packard v. Fox Film
Corp., 207 App. Div. 311, 313, 202 N. Y. Supp. 164, 165 (1st Dep't 1923).
8. In a case in which a husband unsuccessfully tried to recover letters written
by him to his wife which she on her death bed had given to her daughter, Judge
Williams dissented as follows: "And though it be conceded that a married woman's
ideas, emotions, and affections are her own, and that her husband should neither be
a tyrant nor a spy over her, who is neither his slave nor his mistress, but his free and
equal companion; still, when she has ceased to live; when no longer capable of emotions
and affections; no longer his free and equal companion, but a lifeless, listless, lump
of clay; when the intelligent, life-inspiring spirit has fled from its earthly habitation,
who has, or can have, as good right to his own compositions, his own confidential,
social, and affectionate letters to his wife, before or after marriage, as the husband?
. . . But the property of the receiver of letters, unless these be necessary to vindicate
rights of property or character, or repel unjust aspersions, in its very nature, is essen-
tially a life estate, the only purposes being for the individual to whom sent, and peculiarly
personal to the receiver; hence, when the receiver dies, the whole s#ecial property In
him is extinguished, and then, not only the general, but the entire property, is in the
author." Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. 480, at 502 and 504 (1867).
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alone and was peculiarly personal to him, and that upon the receiver's
death the entire property in the letter reverted to its writer. But this sug-
gestion tends to place upon the receiver an inconvenient duty of preserv-
ing letters indefinitely, contrary to general usage, and would make for admin-
istrative difficulty in restoring letters to their writers after the receiver's
death. Consequently this proposal has never received judicial approval, and
upon the receiver's death his letters pass to his personal representative.0
There are, however, certain restrictions upon the receiver's ownership
of the physical document., The first is suggested by a case in which a truss
manufacturing concern, which had received some 60,000 letters in response
to its advertisements concerning the curative quality of its wares, contracted
to sell these letters .to a physician who intended to use them to drum up
trade; the court refused to enforce the contract on the ground that public
policy opposed this sort of trafficking in such intimate letters1 0 The second
limitation is that letters may not be seized by the receiver's creditors in insol-
vency or bankruptcy proceedings." And finally, although letters pass to the
personal representative of the receiver, they are not such assets as may be
sold in the course of the administration of the estate in order to pay its
debts. Hence the representative of the estate must pass the letter on to
the legatees or next of kin.' 2 These rules qualify the receiver's property
9. Eyre v. Higbee, 35 Barb. 502 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1861); Earl of Granard v.
Dunldn, 1 Ball & B. 207 (1809); see Grigsby v. Brecdnridge, 5 Ky. 480, 491 (1867).
But cf. In re Ryan's Estate, 115 Misc. 472, 188 N. Y. Supp. 3S7 (Surr. Ct. 1921).
Mail addressed to a deceased person is delivered to the executor or administrator
of his estate; if there be none, delivery is made to the surviving spouse, unless there
be other claimants, in which event the instructions of the Post Office Solicitor as to
the particular case are followed. If no legal representative, surviving spouse, or other
claimants are found, the letter is sent to the Dead Letter Office. U. S. Post Office
Dep't-Postal Laws and Regulations (1932) §787.
10. Rice v. Williams, 32 Fed. 437 (C. C. E.D. Wis. 1887); see Baker v. Libbie,
210 'Mass. 599, 606, 97 X. E. 109, 112 (1912). As this is the only case exemplifying
such a restriction, its scope is as yet undefined. Yet this prohibition upon sale probably
will apply not only to the receiver, but to his heirs and assigns as well.
11. See Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 607, 97 N. E. 109, 112 (1912); Atmun,
CoPYRIGHT Law AND PascricE (1936) 49; cf. Bartlett v. Crittenden, 2 Fed. Caw.
No. 1076, at 96S (C. C. Ohio 1849). But cf. Banker v. Caldwell, 3 Mfinn. 94 (1859).
And cf. cases cited in footnote 12, inIra.
Nor, it seems, are letters taxable as personal property. See Leon Loan and Abstract
Co. v. Equalization Board, 86 Iowa 127, 134, 53 N. V. 94, 95 (1892); Note (1896)
51 L. R. A. 353, 381.
12. Eyre v. Higbee, 35 Barb. 502 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1861); In re Ryan's Estate,
115 Misc. 472, 188 N. Y. Supp. 387 (Surr. Ct 1921); see Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass.
599, 607, 97 N. E. 109, 112 (1912).
It has been suggested that the executor of the receiver may be empowered to
destroy those letters which in the executors opinion would be productive 'of injury
if published. See Ingram, J., concurring in Eyre v. Higbee, .mpra. This suggestion,
of course, opposes the principle that the letter must be turned over to the next of kin.
And as the next of kin cannot publish the letter anyhow, see inra p. 503, it is unneces-
sary to give the executor the power of destruction for that reason.
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right in the letter into something private and only semi-commercial: he
has a limited right to sell the letter, and a letter is treated as a personal
effect, too private to be sold for creditors.1 2a
The only legal interest the Wvriter may be said to possess with respect to
the physical document is a possible right to secure copies. For although no
case has arisen directly upon the point, it has been suggested in dicta that
the writer of a letter may compel the receiver either to give- him copies of
it or to grant him access to it for the purpose of making copies.' 3 Implici.
in this suggestion, of course, is the supposition that the letter exists at the
time the copy is desired, for surely the receiver cannot be forced to attempt
to recall from memory the contents of the letter nor to recount them if
remembered.1 4 But even if th letter does exist, it is doubtful whether the
writer should be given an absolute right to secure copies. While such a
right would sometimes aid him in exercising his well-recognized privilege of
publishifg the letter,'0 he could protect himself fully by making a copy before
mailing the letter.10 And to avoid inconveniencing the receiver unduly by
compelling hin to conduct a thoroughly exhaustive search among his papers,
it would seem better to qualify the sender's right by requiring the receiver
merely to make a reasonable effort to locate the letter and to loan it for
copying.
Ideas Coidained in the Letter. To give the originator of an idea a prop-
erty right in it is in harmony with the general bias of the law in favor of
allowing each man to profit from his own effort. Yet as an intangible idea
is so difficult to isolate that it is seldom possible to describe it precisely, to
compare it accurately with another idea, or to find its ultimate author, the
administrative difficulty of protecting ideas is enormous. 17 Attempts to
protect rights in such intangibles result in hopeless confusion, and the courts
12a. The decisions holding that letters are immune to the claims of creditors may
be founded on the same policy that affords exemptions to other intimate personal
property. Thus, while the debtor is alive, many of his personal effects are exempt.
See, e.g., UTAir Rav. STAT. ANN. (1933) § 104-37-13 (debtor's library, all hanging
pictures or paintings of his family); VA. CODE (Michie, 1930) § 6552 (family Bible,
family pictures, debtor's library). The Federal Bankruptcy Act enforces these exemp-
tions. 30 STAT. 548 (1898), 11 U.S. C. § 24 (1934). And some states provide that
upon the debtor's death similar property is to be exempt from administration as "assets,"
and is to be passed to the surviving spouse and children. See, e.g., Oixo GEN. CODE
ANN. (Page, 1926) §§ 10654 (2), 10655.
13. See Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 605, 97 N. E. 109, Ill (1912).
14. See 1 MORGAN, LAw OF LiTERATuRE (1875) 449, 450; Parker, mrPra note 2,
at 459.
15. See infra p. 498.
16. Such a copy of course belongs to the writer. Ipswich Mills v. Dillon, 260 Mass.
453, 157 N.E. 604 (1927) ; In re Wheatroft, [1877] 6 Ch. 97; see 1 MonG0A, LA w o
LITERATURE (1875) 450.
17. For an elaboration of these arguments, see (1935) 44 YALE L. 3. 1269, 1270.
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have usually held that there are no property rights in bare ideas.' s This is
certainly true if the originator of an idea voluntarily discloses it to the pub-
lic.19 However, a few cases suggest that bare ideas might be protected if
disclosed only upon some contractual basis20 as, for example, by contract-
ing to furnish a certain idea of value before divulging to the purchaser its
exact nature.2'
These principles may be applied to abstract ideas contained in letters.
Thus, the receiver of an ordinary letter is free to appropriate and use any
ideas suggested by it,-2 for the writer has voluntarily disclosed them by
sending the letter. Only by a preliminary contractual agreement between
the writer of the litter and its proposed receiver concerning the prospective
disclosure of a novel idea,-3 or perhaps by a notice on the envelope of the
letter that the opening of the letter by the receiver binds him not to appro-
priate for his own use whatever original ideas may be contained therein, 4
does the writer have any chance of protecting them. But if the letter em-
bodies more than abstract ideas, containing, for example, an advertising
scheme, an architect's plan, or a moving picture scenario, the administrative
difficulties of protection are not so great, and as a result the courts some-
times will prohibit the unauthorized use of the letter's contents even though
voluntarily disclosed.?- Also, in certain circumstances, judicial protection
18. Burnell v. Chown, 69 Fed. 993 (C. C. N. D. Ohio, IS95) Fendler v. Morosco,
253 N. Y. 281, 171 N. E. 56 (1930); Downes v. Culbertson, 153 Ifisc. 14, 275 N. Y.
Supp. 233 .(Sup. Ct. 1934); Mackay v. Benjamin Franlin Realty Co., 28S Pa. 207,
135 Atl. 613 (1927); cf. (1927) 25 Micr. L. REv. 886; (1930) 15 Conir. L Q. 633.
The ideas contained in an unpublished manuscript are not such property as may
be the subject of an action quasi in ren. See (1926) 26 Cor- L Ru 1034; (1926)
40 HAmv. L. REv. 137.
19. Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Tubbs, 216 Fed. 401 (C. C. %V. D. Mich. 1903) ; Haslins
v. Ryan, 75 N. J. Eq. 330, 78 At. 566 (1908) ; Stein v. Morris, 120 Va. 390, 91 S. E.
177 (1917).
20. Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 43 F. (2d) 685 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930); Lueddecke v.
Chevrolet Motor Co., 70 F. (2d) 345 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934); Bristol v. Equitable Life,
132 N. Y. 264, 30 N. E. 506 (1892); Soule v. Bon Ami Co., 201 App. Div. 794, 195
N. Y. Supp. 574 (2d Def't 1922).
21. Cf. Dodge v. Construction Information Co., 183 Mass. 62, 66 N. E. 204 (1903).
22. Cf. Philip v. Pennell, [1907] 2 Ch. 577. But cf. 1 MoRo=€, LAw or Lrrmun
(1375) 449, 451.
23. Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 43 F. (2d) 685 (C. C.A. 2d, 1930); Lueddecle
v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 70 F. (2d) 345 ( C. A. 8th, 1934) ; Bristol v. Equitable Life,
132 N. Y. 264, 30 N. E. 506 (1892).
Yet the idea must be original; contracts which have as subject matter ideas of
common kmowledge will not be enforced even though the idea in fact prove of value
to the purchaser. Soule v. Boa Ami Co., 201 App. Div. 794, 195 N. Y. Supp. 574
(2d Dep't 1922) (raising prices -to increase profits); Burwell v. Baltimore & Ohio
R. R., 31 Ohio App. 22, 164 N. E. 434 (1928) (drilling wells to get vwater).
24. See Parker, suipra note 2, at 455.
25. Advertising scheme: Liggett & Meyer Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 194 N. E. 206
(Ind. App. Ct. 1935), (1935) 44 YAt.u L. J. 1269; cf. Ryan v. Century Brewing Ass'n,
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might be extended to news transmitted by letter. Although the writer of a
friendly letter probably can retain no dominion over the news which the
letter contains, perhaps a business concern disseminating news regularly in
the form of letters may control the use of it by the receivers.20
Publication. Besides containing abstract ideas and certain combinations
of ideas, as in the form of advertising schemes, all letters of necessity have
a certain word form. This arrangement of words itself is the subject of
property rights. It has long been recognized at common lav that the author
of a literary manuscript is privileged to publish it whenever he desires.2r
This rule is of course designed to permit an author to profit from sale for
publication of his intellectual creations. By analogy to literary manuscripts$,
the courts have held that the writer of a letter is free to publish it himself,
the receiver being powerless to prevent the publication. 28 The writer may
use his own copy of the letter, or perhaps may obtain one from the receiver.2 0
Or if the writer does not desire to publish himself, he may sell his privilege
,of publication to another.30 There may, however, be one exception to this
rule. If the letter be written to the government, it has been suggested in
dicta that the government may prohibit publication of it despite the wish
of the writer, because of certain secrets or confidential information which
might be contained therein.3 '
55 P. (2d) 1053 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1936). Contra: Lueddecke v. Chevrolet Motor Co.,.
70 F. (2d) 345 (C. C.A. 8th, 1934). Architect's plan: Cf. Wright v. Eisle, 86 App.
Div. 356, 83 N. Y. Supp. 887 (2d Dep't 1903); Larkin v. Pennsylvania R. R. Cot,
125 Misc. 238, 210 N. Y. Supp. 374 (Sup. Ct. 1925); Comment (1927) 75 U. OF PA.
L. Rv. 458. Scenario: Thompson v. Famous Players-Laski Corp., 3 F. (2d) 707'
(N. D. Ga. 1925).
26. Cf. Dodge v. Construction Information Co., 183 Mass. 62, 66 X. E. 204 (1903);
Dodge Corp. v. Comstock, 140 Misc. 105, 251 N. Y. Supp. 172 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
Certainly the disseminators could prevent its use by a rival news agency. Intei-
national News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215 (1918), (1919) 32 HAuV,
L. Ray. 566, (1919) 28 YALE L. J. 387; Gilmore v. Sammons, 269 S. W. 861 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1925). Cf. Associated Press v. KVOS, 80 F. (2d) 575 (C. C.A. 9th, 1935)..
27. Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N. Y. 532 (1872); Xortlander v. Bradford, 116 Misc.
664, 190 N. Y. Supp. 311 (Sup. Ct. 1921); 1 MORoAx, LAw oF LITERATURE (1875) 387
28. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 4901 (C. C. Mass. 1841); Knights of Kit
Klux Klan v. International Magazine Co., 294 Fed. 661 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923); Grigsby
v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. 480 (1867); Pope v. Curl, 2 Atk. 342 (1741).
Although the receiver cannot prevent the writer from publishing the letters, perhaps
the receiver can prevent publication by persons not in privity with the author. Cf. Earl
of Granard v. Dunkin, 1 Ball & Beatty 207 (1809).
In Mexico, private letters usually cann9t be published without the consent of botK
correspondents. See BowxEmR, COPYIG31T (1912) 421.
29. See .supra p. 496.
30. No cases have been discovered in which this point is litigated. Yet as the
author of a literary manuscript may sell his right of publication, see cases cited in
footnote 27 supra, it follows that the writer of a letter may do the same. Also, tho-
power of sale is implicit in the recognized right of publication.
31. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 4901, at 347 (C. C. Mass. 1841); cf.
CURTIS, COPYIGHT (1847) 98.
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Upon such publication 32 of his letter, the writer loses all his common
law rights in it, and it becomes the "property of mankind".ss Only by means
of the copyright statutes may the property right in the word-form of the
letter be protected after publication.3- Although letters are not specifically
mentioned in the federal copyright laws,35 letters may be the subject of
copyright.30 They may be incorporated in a book or they may be entered
separately. And if the writer dies before attempting to copyright his letters,
presumably this right passes to his 'heirs,37 thdugh there is no reported case
upon this point.
The common law not only permits the author of a literary manuscript to
publish it at will, but also has long protected unpublished manuscripts by
giving their authors the power to prevent unauthorized publication.3s View-
32. It is difficult to state categorically exactly what acts constitute publication. A
private exhibition to a few people of a copy of the letter is not enough. Cf. Palmer
v. DeWitt, 47 N. Y. 532 (1872). Nor is the gift of a copy of the letter. Cf. 1 Afon..r,
I.-v or L.Tum~uRE (1875) 392. There must be some unequivocal act indicating an
intent to dedicate the letter to the public, as, for e.ample, a sale or an exposure for
sale. Cf. Vernon Abstract Co. v. Waggoner Title Co., 49 Tex. Civ. App. 144, 107
S. IV. 919 (1903). Reproduction of the letter in a newspaper or in a book is a publi-
cation. Cf. Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U. S. 82 (IS99). And if the letter is so printed, an
appended notice to the effect that no publication is intended is ineffective. Cf. Wagner
v. Conried, 125 Fed. 798 (C. C. S.D. N.Y. 1903). For a general discussion of this
subject, see Comment (1934) 19 ST. L. L. REv. 323; Note (1896) 51 L R. A. 353.
33. Cf. American Code Co. v. Bensinger, 282 Fed. 829 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922) ; Palmer
v. DeWitt, 47 N. Y. 532 (1872); Kortlander v. Bradford, 116 Misc. 664, 190 N. Y.
Supp. 311 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
34. Cf. Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U. S. 182 (1909); O'Neill v.
General Film Co., 171 App. Div. 854, 157 N. Y. Supp. 1028 (Ist Dep't 1916). For the
history and development of the copyright laws, see De Borla, The Law on Literary
Property (1935) 14 Pmnirr. L J. 366; Rogers, History of Literary Property (1903)
7 MicH. L. REv. 101; Rogers, History of Literary Properly (1911) 5 Ii. L REv. 551.
Even if the letters are published while uncopyrighted, it is possible that their use
by others may be enjoined on the theory of unfair competition. Cf. Meyer v. HurvAtz,
5 F. (2d) 370 (E. D. Pa. 1925).
35. See Bowme, COPYlGHT (1912) 91.
36. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 4901 (C.C. Mass. 1S41); see Bowmie,
CoPYmR T (1912) 92; cf. MacMillan & Co. v. Dent, [1906] 1 Ch. 101. But cf. Parker,
supra note 2, at 469.
'37. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 4901, at 346 (C. C. Mass. 1841). But
cf. MacMillan & Co. v. Dent, [1907] 1 Ch. 107; Omrmp., TnE LAw or Coevnloa?
(1912) 24. This follows by analogy from the related principle that the executor, admin-
istrator, or heirs of the author of an unpublished manuscript may copyright his works.
35 STAT. 1077 (1909), 17 U.S. C. § 8 (1934); see Bowmen, CoPYR.GHT (1912)- 102.
38. See Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 656 (U.S. 1834); Caliga v. Inter Ocean
Newspaper Co., 215 U. S. 182, 188 (1909); 35 STAT. 1076 (1909), 17 U.S. C. § 2
(1934) ; 1 MoRGAN, LAW or LITERATURE (1875) § 182. Creditors of the author cannot
compel him to publish in order to get the profits from such proposed publication. See
Currs, CoPyIGHT (1847) 85, 218. Of course, if the author publishes voluntarily,
creditors can attach the monies obtained from this publication.
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ing letters as unpublished manuscripts for this purpose, the courts early
decided that the writer of a letter may prevent its unauthorized publication
by the receiver. Yet from this analogy a few courts contended that only
those letters which were "literary" compositions could be thus protected,
and that the writers of ordinary private letters could not prevent their pub-
lication. 9 Administration of this rule required the courts to indulge in the
solemn comedy of making "literary" judgments. The test of a' "literary"
letter might be popular opinion as to the ability of the writer; it might be
the opinion of the writer himself or of the judge as to the literary merit of
the particular letter at issue; it might be the intention of the writer as to
publication at some later date; or it might be the price which the letter would
bring if sold. 'Again, in one sense, all letters are literary, for all letters are
composed by persons who put on paper certain ideas in certain expressions
peculiar to themselves. Impressed with the difficulty of defining a "literary"
letter, the courts abandoned this distinction and have not followed it in a
reported case since 1848.40 Equity today generally will afford injunctive
reliefto the writer against the publication of his letters by the receiver, re
gardless of the subject matter, the literary merit, or the popular interest in
the letters.41
Although the rejection of this distinction undoubtedly was caused in part
by the difficulty of classifying letters as "personal" and "literary", another
reason for the inclusion of private or domestic letters among those products
of the- mind which are given legal protection may have been the develop-
ment and recognition of the right of privacy. This right, first discussed at
length by Brandeis and Warren,42 recognizes the social interest in mini-
mizing interferences with privacy. Though no court has expressly relied
on the right of privacy in preventing the receiver of a letter from publishing
it against the author's wish, and though some courts in so holding expressly
39. Percival v. Phipps, 2 V. & B. 19 (1813); Wetmore v. Scovell, 3 Edw. Ch.
515 (N. Y. 1842); Hoyt v. MacKenzie, 3 Barb. Ch. 320 (N. Y. 1848); see Parker,
supra note 2, at 470.
40. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 4901 (C. C. Mass. 1841) ; Woolsey v. Judd,
11 How. Prac. 49 (Super. Ct. N. Y..1855); see 1 MORGAN, LAW or LiTE.ATuP (1875)
§ 198.
41. Roberts v. McKee, 29 Ga. 161 (1859); Denis v. LeClerc, I Mart. (0. S.] 297
(Sup. Ct. Terr. New Orleans, 1811); Pope v. Curl, 2 Atk. 342 (1741); Gee v.
Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402 (1818); Andrew v. Raeburn, 22 W. R. 564 (1874); see
Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. 480, 488 (1867); Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 605,
97 N.E. 109, 111 (1912); CURTIS, COPY IGHT (1847) 92, 94; 2 STORY, EQUlTY Junis-
PRUDENCE (1836) §§ 944-948.
If the letter is published wrongfully, the writer may recover damages for the injury
to him. Thurston v. Charles, 21 T.L.R. 659 (1905); see DRONE, COPYUGHT (1879)
131; WAGNER, DAmAGEs, PROITS, & ACCOUNTING IN PATENT CASES (1926) 113-116;
The Law of Stole; Letters (1908) 15 BENCH & BAR 1, 3; cf. 35 STAT. 1076 (1909),
17 U. S. C. § 2 (1934).
42. Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy (1890) 4 HAv. L. REv. 193.
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reject the idea as support for their decision,4 3 it is apparently the under-
lying motive in many decisions. The justification usually advanced, however,
as the basis of the writer's right to prevent publication is that one has a
possessory interest in the rewards of one's own labor,-4 the theory being
that if the receiver of a letter is allowed to publish it at will, he can reap
any benefits to be derived from such publication, thereby depriving the
actual author of the letter of any chance to profit, since a subsequent publi-
cation would ordinarily be worthless.
There are, however, at least four exceptions ±c this rule that the writer
may prevent publication of the letter by its receiver. First, the litter may be
published by the receiver against the writer's consent in a proper legal pro-
ceeding.45 The receiver may bring the letter into court voluntarily, or he
may be forced to do so by court order.'0 Thus, letters may be appended as
exhibits to pleadings,4 7 or may be introduced as evidence during the trial. 8
For example, in a suit for breach of promise, the plaintiff may bring into
court over defendant's objection letters written to her by defendant, in order
to prove the marriage contract. 9 However, if the letters would incriminate
43. Wetmore v. Scovell, 3 Edw. Ch. 515 (N. Y. 1842); Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How.
Prac. 49 (Super. Ct. N. Y. 1855) ; Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402 (1818); see 2 Srony,
Equriy JumspRuDmmxc (1836) § 945; Brand, Common Law Property in Nvotion (1912)
1 BENcHr & BAR [N. S.] 100, 109. But see 1 MonaA, LAw or Lnm xunE (1875) 457.
44. See Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. 480, 485 (1867); Baker v. Libbie, 210
Mass. 599, 604, 97 N. M 109, 111 (1912). Still another theory which has been advanced
to explain the writer's right to prevent publication by the receiver is that of an implied
contract or trust relationship between the writer and the receiver. See DnozrE, Co rmuT
(1879) 129; 1 MORGAx, LAw or LiTaA-vux (1875) 457.
45. Hopkinson v. Burghley, L. R. 2 Ch. 447 (1867) ; see Gee -. Pritchard, 2 Svns.
402, 427 (1818); CUmIS, COPYRIGHT (1847) 92; 2 STonv,, EQvTY JuruspauamicE
(1836) §948. The writer cannot get damages for such a publication. See Omrmw,
THE LAw oF Co yRIGT (1912) 24. Cf. CARorL, ALicE's A TVUEnOEs flI WomMLAM
(1866) 109: "The King turned pale, and shut his note-book hastily. 'Consider your
verdict,' he said to the jury, in a low trembling voice.
'There's more evidence to come yet, please your majesty,' -aid the White Rabbit,
jumping up in a great hurry; 'this paper has just been picked up!
'What's in it?' said the Queen.
'I haven't opened it yet,' said the White Rabbit 'but it seems to be a letter, written
by the prisoner to--to somebody.
'It must have been that: said the King, 'unless it was written to nobody, which
isn't usual, you know?"
46. Hopkinson v. Burghley, L. R. 2 Ch. 447 (1867).
47. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 4901, at 346 (C. C. Mass. 1841) ; Denis
v. LeClerc, 1 Mart [0. S.] 297, 319 (Super. Ct. Terr. New Orleans, 1811).
48. Baldwin v. Von Micheroux, 83 Hun. 43 (Sup. Ct N. Y. 1894); Barrett v.
Fish, 72 Vt 18, 47 Atl. 174 (1899) ;.see Bow-EER, "CoPYRMGHT (1912) 92; cf. Laidlaw
v. Lear, 30 Ont. Rep. 26 (1898). It has been held that the courts will disregard the
manner in which the letters were obtained. Barrett v. Fish, mtpra; cf. Ashburton v. Pape,
[1913] 2 C. 469.
49. Tefft v. Marsh, 1 W. Va. 38 (1864).
19371
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the person required by law to produce them, that person may decline to
reveal them.50 Likewise, if the letters are privileged communications, as,
for example, between attorney and client, they cannot be introduced against
the wish of the person possessing the privilege.r1  Of course at the end of
the trial, the letters must be returned tc their owners, and cannot be pub-
lish.d after judgment has been rendered. 2 Second, it has been said in dicta
that the government may upon occasion publish letters written to it even
against the will of the writers.5 3 The nature of the documents, perhaps
embracing historical, military, or diplomatic information, may make publi-
cation desirable if not imperative. No case has arisen directly upon this
point. Third, by the doctrine of literary accession, if the literary composi-
tion is the result of labor performed by one in the employ of another, the
literary property therein belongs to the employer rather than to the writer64
Therefore, where an agent writes a letter for his principal, the receiver can
publish it against the will of the agent.m Fourth, it has been held that the
receiver may publish a letter against the will of the writer in vindication of
character. 5 Thus, where a publisher printed an article under the name of
the author who afterwards denied authorship and attempted to malign the
publisher for this alleged deception, the publisher was allowed to publish
letters received from the author which proved his authorship and thus vin-
dicated the character of the publisher.sr Whether the accusation or defama-
tion of character need be publicly made has not been decidedYu8 But it siems
that this right is personal to the receiver and may not be conferred on other
persons. 0 The desirability of this fourth exception appears doubtful. By
50. See Barrett v. Fish, 72 Vt. 18, 21, 47 Atl. 174, 175 (1899). The extent of this
exception is as yet undefined by the courts.
51. Ashburton v. Pape, [1913] 2 Ch. 469.
52. King v. King, 25 Wyo. 275, 168 Pac. 730 (1917); Palin v. Gathercole, 1 Coll.
565 (1844).
53. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 4901, at 347 (C. C. Mass. 1841) ; CuRTis,
COPYRIGHT (1847) 98; DRoNE, COPYRIGHT (1879) 132. Even if there were no privilege,
the writer would have procedural difficulties in bringing suit against the government
for injunction or for damages.
54. Howard v. Gunn, 32 Beav. 462 (1863); see Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599,
605, 97 N. E. 109, 111 (1912); 1 MORGAx, LAW OF LITERATURE (1875) 467.
55. Howard v. Gunn, 32 Beav. 462 (1863). The agent might, however, be specially
authorized by his principal to restrain publication.
56. Widdemer v. Hubbard, 19 Phila. 263 (Common Pleas Pa. 1887); see Roberts
v. McKee, 29 Ga. 161, 164 (1859) ; Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. Prac. 49, 53, 80 (Super.
Ct. N. Y. 1855); 1 MORGAzr, LAW OF LITERATURE (1875) 464; cf. Lytton v. Dewey,
54 L. J. [N. S.] Ch. 293 (1884); Labouchere v. Hess, 77 L. T. Ch. 559 (1897);l
OLOFInD, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT (1912) 24.
57. Percival v. Phipps, 2 V. & B. 19 (1813).
58. It has been suggested, however, that the accusation must be made in public.
See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 4901, at 346 (C. C. Mass. 1841); CuRTis)
COPYRIGHT (1847) 92.
59. See DRONE, COPYRIGHT (1879) 138.
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allowing the receiver to publish valuable letters in vindication of his char-
acter, the safeguards against unauthorized publication are weakened, and
the writer may suffer an invasion of privacy, a loss of profit, or both.
Further, by permitting the receiver to determine the extent of the wrong
done to him and to decide whether or not to publish the letters and what
letters to publish, it is made possible for the receiver to retaliate and perhaps
to injure the writer far more than the receiver himsielf was injuredcO And
finally, the receiver is amply protected without this privilege of publication.
For he has an adequate remedy in court for the injury done to him by the
writer by a suit in tort for slander or libel.01 And in such a suit the letters
in question could be introduced if necessary under the proper supervision of
the court. -
The writer of a letter not only may in general prohibit an unauthorized
publication of it by its receiver, but also may prevent similar publications
by any transferee of the receiver, regardless of whether such transferee
obtains the letter by gift, sale, intestacy, will, or in the capacity of personal
representative.0 Nor can those who obtain letters by 'subterfuge or theft
publish them without the writers' consent 63
But when the writer of the letter dies, the somewhat different problem
arises as to whether his right to prevent publication by the receiver or the
receiver's transferees is inheritable. It is not altogether persuasive to argue
that the heirs or next of kin should inherit this inchoate privilege of publi-
cation, within the policy, of giving every person the fruits of his labors.
They themselves presumably have done nothing to deserve the profits to
be derived from publication; and the only ground on which the argument
can be supported is that in order to reward' the writer, he should not only
be allowed to reap the profits himself, but also be permitted to pass that
privilege on at death to whomever he c.hooses. Nor does the right to privacy
afford an entirely satisfactory basis for allowing the writer's heirs or next
of kin to prevent publication. The interest in privacy seems to be peculiarly
personal by nature and it is difficult to conceive of the heirs or next of kin
as having a protectable interest in the privacy of the dead writer. It is true
60. See DRONE, COPYRIGHT (1879) 133; 2 STaRY, E2urry JurusPrRum:cs (1836)
§948; cf. Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402 (1818).
61. See HARPER, ToaRs (1933) §§235, 236, 246, 249; ci. M'Dougall v. Claridge,
I Camp. 267 (1808).
62. Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. 480 (1867) ; Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. Prac.
49 (Super. Ct. N. Y. 1855); Labouchere v. Hess, 77 L. T. Ch. 559 (1397); Laidlaw
v. Lear, 30 Ont. Rep. 26 (1898) ; see Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 4901, at 346
(C. C. Mass. 1841); Cuaris, CoPYrIGHT (I847) 92; Tito Unaulhorirxd Publication of
Private Correspondence (1909) 19 BENCE & BAM" 92; cf. ri re Ryan's Estate, 115
Mlisc. 472, 188 N. Y. Supp. 387 (Surr. Ct. 1921).
63. Denis v. LeClerc, 1 Mart. [0. S.] 297 (Super. Ct. Terr. Nev Orleans, 1811);
Dock v. Dock, 180 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 411 (1S97) ; Barrett v. Fish, 72 7t. 18, 47 At]. 174
(1899); Ashburton v. Pape, [1913] 2 Ch. 469.
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that if the letter contained information about its author which, if published,
would seriously affect his reputation, the writer's relatives might well desire
to protect his' good name from unfavorable publicity by preventing publica-
tion. But it seems doubtful whether they would be entitled to relief in view
of the analogous rule that the relatives of a deceased person cannot suc-
cessfully maintain suits for libel or slander of the deceased by third per-
sons. 4 H-owever, the writer's relatives might sometimes be able to prevent
publication on the theory that it would violate their own right of privacy.
But it would then be necessary either to show that the contents of the letter
concerned them directly, or to rely on the rather tenuous argument that
publication would damage the deceased's reputation and the resulting pub-
licity would reflect on them as relatives, thus invading their privacy.
Only five reported cases have been discovered holding directly upon this
problem of the inheritability of the writer's right to prevent unauthorized
publication of his letters. All five hold that the right is inheritable, but
merely assume that conclusion without discussion. In four of these cases,
the plaintiff was the writer's executor ;65 in the fifth, the plaintiffs were his
immediate family. 0 Yet as only one of these cases arose in the United
States, this question can hardly be deemed to be settled in this country. 7
Clearly the rule of these cases fully protects both the right of the writer and
his heirs to the profits from his intellectual creation and the desire of his
relatives for privacy. Also, this rule is in accord with the related principle
that the power to prevent publication of an author's manuscript descends
to his heirs, even though a copy of the manuscript is in the hands of
another.' But this protection is at the expense of preventing the publica-
tion of many letters of literary or historical interest. Perhaps, then, a better
rule would be that the receiver of letters may publish them after the writei's
death unless the heirs of the writer can give in court a good reason for
preventing publication; and if it is felt necessary to protect the pecuniary
64. See HAmem, TORTS (1933) § 235; ODGERs, LmaE AwD SLANDER (5th ed. 1911)
23, 456, 457; SaEsumAx, LIBEL AND SLANDER (1933) § 97.
65. Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N. E. 109 (1912) ; Thompson v. Stanhope,
Arab. 737 (1774) ; Lytton v. Dewey, 54 L. J. [N. S] Ch. 293 (1884) ; Philip v. Pennell,
f1907] 2 Ch. 577. Since these cases, as well as the one cited in footnote 66 infra, arose
within a very few years after the death of the writer, perhaps they can be distinguished
on the theory that this inheritable right is or should be of limited duration.
66. Cadell v. Stewart, 1 Bell's Com. 116t (Court Sessions Scotland, 1804), discussed
in Bartlett v. Crittenden, 2 Fed. Cas. No. 1076, at 970 (C. C. Ohio, 1849) and in
1 MORGAN, LAv oF LITERAruRE (1875), at 457.
67. Dicta in at least two. other cases supports the rule that the right is inheritable.
Sed Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 4901, at 346 (C. C. Mass. 1841) ; Denis v. LeClerc,
I Mart. [0. S.] 297, 302 (Super. Ct. Terr. New Orleans, 1811); CuRTIS, ConyvmonT
(1847) 92.
68. See CuRTis, COPYRGHET (1847) 86, 217.
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